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Art Law: Looking Back, Looking Forward
By Christine Steiner and Bee-Seon Keum*
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider The Thomas Crown Affair, the Hollywood hit about
a clever attempt by burglars to break into the Metropolitan
Museum of Art in New York City. The movie has all the drama of
Art Law writ large and, indeed, it seems that the art market is
now pure entertainment or spectator sport. Art law has grown
into a recognized area of law—taught in many law schools and
practiced by a select group of visual arts lawyers who represent
artists, collectors, auction houses, museums, galleries, and other
players in the “art world.”
It should be noted that Art Law is a misnomer; it is not a
field unto itself, but rather it is a multi-disciplinary practice
requiring extensive knowledge of diverse substantive areas of the
law—contracts, torts, real property, tax, trusts and estates,
criminal law, intellectual property, commercial law, international
business transactions, civil procedure, and more—combined
with experience in the business practices of the arcane fine
arts industry.
This young field is changing rapidly. Even late in the last
century, most business was done on a handshake. The few
players were known to one another in the art centers of New
York, London, or Paris, the transactions were smaller, the stakes
were lower, and lawsuits were relatively rare. As we discuss
below, the handshake norms of these cozy circles proved
outmoded as sales became global, the sophisticated collector base
expanded, museums became bigger in size and number,
commercial galleries proliferated, and auction houses hammered
down record sales.

* Christine Steiner is of counsel with Withers Bergman LLP, where she represents
artists and their estates, collectors, galleries, art advisors, and museums. She previously
served as assistant general counsel for Smithsonian Institution and as general counsel for
The J. Paul Getty Trust, including the Getty Museum. She teaches Art Law at Loyola
Law School. Bee-Seon Keum is an associate with Withers Bergman LLP. Her practice
focuses on tax matters and transactions, including purchases, loans, consignments,
Section 1031 like-kind exchanges, and charitable donations of art. The authors express
their gratitude to Diana Wierbicki, Global Head of Art Law at Withers Bergman LLP, for
her guidance in this article.
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The legal issues in this area can be vexing, with
cross-jurisdictional, multi-party opaque transactions challenging
every aspect of a practitioner’s creativity and knowledge. The
authors are privileged to practice in a firm which built its art law
practice with Ralph Lerner and Judith Bresler, authors of Art
Law: A Guide for Collectors, Investors, Dealers and Artists, the
pioneering work in the field, first published in 1989.1 The work,
now in its fourth edition, remains the last word on all aspects of
the practice of art law, including gallery sales, private sales,
artist-dealer relations, auctions, authenticity, international
issues, impairments of title, First Amendment, copyright, moral
rights of artists, tax and estate planning for collectors and artists,
museum issues, and a host of other legal considerations. The
treatise also includes art-related legislation and model agreements.
This field garners great attention from the media and the
public, largely because the high-profile cases are intriguing—stolen
art, fakes and forgeries, wartime crimes, antitrust conspiracies,
archeological riches—indeed the compelling stuff of blockbuster
movies. Even yeoman legal issues such as contracts, tax, and
copyright are worthy of attention because, quite simply, art
matters. This Article will look back to the origins of art law, trace
the legislative and regulatory developments of the evolving field,
and look forward to the expected maturation of the practice.
II. ORIGINS OF ART LAW AND ITS CURRENT STATE
Much of the body of law that governs commercial
transactions developed out of civil litigation involving disputes
between artists, dealers, collectors, and other stakeholders in the
art industry. As noted above, and as seen through case law, a
wide range of preexisting disciplines, including commercial law,
contract law, and tort law have provided the foundations for art
law related to commercial transactions.
A. The Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) is the most
important collection of statutes that applies to purchases and
sales of art.2 Article 2 of the UCC, which deals with the sale of
goods, is the principal source for the rules regarding authenticity
and title, two of the most important issues from both a buyer and

1 See generally RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR
COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, & ARTISTS (4th ed. 2012).
2 See id. at 87–88.
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a seller’s perspective. To date, forty-nine states have adopted
Article 2 of the UCC.3
Title and authenticity are particular concerns in an art sale
because infirmities in either can have detrimental consequences
for the marketability of the artwork. The buyer must be assured
that the seller is the owner of the work and has the ability to
transfer good and marketable title to the work, free and clear of
all claims; the buyer must have free and unencumbered right of
possession and enjoyment of the work. The buyer must also be
assured that the work is authentic and that it is what the seller
represents—typically that it is by a particular artist and/or from
a particular country of origin, period, or culture. The seller, on
the other hand, will want to be very careful about the
representations and warranties he or she is making regarding
the work so as not to be vulnerable to a breach of warranty claim.
Fortunately, Article 2 of the UCC provides the framework for the
rules governing authenticity and title transfer.
1. Authenticity
Authenticity is governed by the warranty provisions of
Article 2, consisting of the express warranty, the implied
warranty of merchantability, and the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose.4 Express warranties arise from
affirmative statements made by a seller regarding the goods.
UCC Section 2-313 provides that:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall
conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller use formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee” or that he
have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation
merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be

3 See Uniform Commercial Code Locator, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
uniform/ucc#a2 [http://perma.cc/7UQF-5SRT]. The State of Louisiana has adopted several
Articles of the UCC, but not Article 2. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-101 to 10:9-710 (2016).
4 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 88–101.
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merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty.5

Thus, a seller’s affirmation of fact or promise that a work is
by a particular artist, or the seller’s description of the work as
being by a particular artist will create an express warranty if
such affirmation or description by the seller becomes part of the
basis of the bargain. As can be seen in Weber v. Peck, an express
warranty by a seller’s description of the work can include a
seller’s statements about the provenance of a work if the buyer
relies on such statements.6
In Weber, the plaintiff, Francis Weber, entered into a
contract with the defendant, an art dealer, to buy a Jacob van
Ruisdael painting for $388,000 plus 5% of the proceeds from the
resale of the painting.7 In the contract, the art dealer agreed to
provide original authenticating letters from Ruisdael experts.
The parties also signed a bill of sale in which the art dealer
warranted that “the above described painting is authentic and as
described above.”8 The applicable description of the painting
included a reference to the painting’s provenance. Although
the art dealer did not provide the original authenticating
letters at the closing, Weber proceeded with the purchase and
subsequently moved forward with placing the painting for sale at
an upcoming auction at Sotheby’s. In the course of that auction
consignment, Weber learned that Sotheby’s was unable to verify
the provenance of the painting and thus deleted value-enhancing
references to seven previous owners and five publications. Weber
sued the art dealer after the Sotheby’s sale did not go well; a bid
was made for $300,000 but payment was never received and
Weber retained the work. Weber’s suit alleged that, having sold
at auction, the painting could not be placed again in the
aftermarket and could not be sold for more than $300,000. Citing
to New York’s UCC 2-313(1)(b), the court ruled in favor of Weber
on the breach of warranty issue, concluding that the art dealer
had breached his warranty of the accuracy of the provenance.9
U.C.C. § 2-313 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016).
See id. at 90–91; Weber v. Peck, No. 97 Civ. 7625(JSM), 1999 WL 493383, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1999). The term “provenance” derives from the French provenire,
meaning “to originate.” The provenance of a work of art “is the historical record of its
ownership” and is related to but distinguishable from authenticity, which for practical
purposes means that a work is by a particular artist; provenance “can bolster claims of a
work’s authenticity,” as records of an object’s presence in a particular collection or in the
artist’s purported workshop can provide strong evidence of a work’s authenticity.
Provenance Guide, INT’L FOUND. ART RES., https://www.ifar.org/provenance_guide.php
[http://perma.cc/NQ4A-7XUN].
7 Weber, 1999 WL 493383, at *1.
8 Id. at *1.
9 Id. at *4.
5
6
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The court did not allow Weber to rescind the entire sale because
Weber knew the authenticating letters were not provided at the
closing and proceeded anyway with the subsequent Sotheby’s
sale. However, the court noted that Weber was not precluded
from seeking damages for breach of the warranty related to the
provenance or the alleged breach of warranty of the
authentication letters. Such damages would depend on the extent
to which the loss in value was caused by the breach.
In addition to express warranties, authenticity issues can
also fall within the ambit of implied warranties, which are
warranties that arise from the circumstances or conduct of the
sale and not from the express statement of a seller.10 The two
types of implied warranties are that of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose.11 The application of implied
warranties to artwork seems to be an imperfect fit, because the
language of the implied warranties suggests that they are
intended to cover the sale of fungible goods.12 A buyer of a forgery
may nevertheless seek to avail himself or herself of these
remedies against the art merchant who sold the forgery.13
UCC Section 2-314(1) provides that, unless excluded or
modified, “a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind.”14 The term “merchant” is defined
as “a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction.”15
In the art context, “merchant” includes commercial art galleries,
auction houses, and art dealers, but does not include individual
collectors who are not in the business of buying and selling art.16
The relevant provisions of UCC Section 2-314(2) provide that, to
be merchantable, goods must at least “pass without objection in
the trade under the contract description,” be “fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used,” and “conform to the
promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if
any.”17 Thus, arguably, a forgery sold by an art merchant would
not pass muster under UCC Section 2-314(2) with regards to the
See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 98.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016). Although the UCC
allows implied warranties to be disclaimed, disclaimers are valid only under proscribed
circumstances. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016).
15 U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016).
16 LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 99.
17 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a), (c), (f) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016).
10
11
12
13
14
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description of the work specified in the agreement of sale or
fitness for the ordinary use for such work.18
UCC Section 2-315 provides as follows:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next
section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.19

Thus, arguably, a forgery would fail to satisfy UCC Section
2-315 if the seller knew of the buyer’s purpose in buying the
artwork (e.g., to purchase an authentic painting by a particular
artist), the seller has knowledge that the buyer is relying on the
seller’s skill or judgment in furnishing the artwork (e.g., the
seller is an art merchant), and the buyer actually relies to his or
her detriment on the seller’s skill.
2. Title
Article 2 of the UCC provides substantial protections for a
buyer against the risk of bad title.20 UCC Sections 2-312(1) and
(2) provide as follows:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty
by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or
other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of
contracting has no knowledge.
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only
by specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason
to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself or that
he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a third person
may have.21

Thus, unless specifically excluded or modified, every contract
for the sale of art includes a warranty stating that the seller is
transferring good title, the seller has the right to transfer title,
and the works are transferred free of security interests, liens or
other encumbrances of which the buyer has no knowledge.22
Additionally, UCC Section 2-312(3) provides that if the seller
is a merchant, there is an implied warranty that the seller

18
19
20
21
22

See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 99.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016).
See id. at 103.
U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016).
Id.
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delivers the goods free from “the rightful claim of any third
person by way of infringement.”23
The case of Menzel v. List determined the appropriate
amount of damages owed to a purchaser if a seller did not pass
good title for the painting to the purchaser.24 Erna Menzel and
her husband had purchased a Chagall painting at auction in
Belgium in 1932 for what was then the equivalent of $150. In
1940, the Menzels fled Belgium ahead of the Nazis, leaving the
painting in their apartment. When the Menzels returned to their
apartment in 1946, they discovered that the painting was
confiscated and a receipt was left in its place. The painting
resurfaced in 1955 when a Parisian art gallery sold it to the
noted New York dealer Klaus Perls for $2800. A few months
later, Perls resold the painting to Albert List for $4000. In 1962,
Mrs. Menzel recognized the painting in an art book mentioning
List as the owner, and she sued List to recover the painting. List,
in turn, impleaded Perls for breach of an implied warranty of
title.25 At trial, the jury directed List to return the painting or
pay Mrs. Menzel for the painting’s then-fair market value of
$22,500 and found for List as against Perls in the amount of
$22,500.26 The appellate court reduced the amount of damages to
$4000 plus interest, but the Court of Appeals reversed,
reinstating the award of $22,500 to List. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that List was entitled to his benefit of the bargain,
which was the fair market value of the painting at the time of its
return to Mrs. Menzel, rather than rescission, which would have
given List only his purchase price plus interest. Commentators
have noted that, by putting List back in the position he would
have been in had Perls not breached the implied warranty of
title, the Court of Appeals placed the full burden of investigation

U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016).
See id. at 104–05; Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. 1969).
LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 104–05. At the time the case was decided,
sales in New York were governed by the New York equivalent of the Uniform Sales Act
instead of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 13 of the Uniform Sales Act provided
as follows:
In a contract to sell or a sale, unless contrary intention appears, there is (1) an
implied warranty on the part of the seller that . . . he has a right to sell the
goods . . . (2) an implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy quiet
possession of the goods as against any lawful claims existing at the time of
the sale.
Menzel, 246 N.E. 2d at 744.
26 Although statute of limitations was not at issue in Menzel v. List, a buyer with a
breach of warranty claim in New York must meet a four-year statute of limitations. See
Doss, Inc. v. Christie's, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 10577 (LAP), 2009 WL 3053713, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 2009) (noting that New York law requires commencement of a buyer's claim for
breach of warranty within four years of delivery of the goods).
23
24
25
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of title to the painting squarely on the dealer.27 The result in a
breach of warranty of title claim, that a seller bears liability for
the increase in value, can indeed be an expensive remedy in the
hothouse environment of art valuation.28
B. Tort Law
The explosive growth of the art market in recent years and
the staggering sums that works of art can command have led to
increased concerns about forgeries. In cases of forgery, tort law
may provide recourse to the aggrieved buyer in addition to
contract law’s breach of warranty claims.29 The injured buyer
may claim that the seller committed the tort of fraud, which
occurs when the seller has made an intentional or knowing
misrepresentation of a material existing fact about the artwork
with the intention that the misrepresentation be relied on and
the buyer in fact relies on such misrepresentation to his or her
detriment.30 The buyer might also claim that the seller engaged
in negligent misrepresentation, which, unlike fraud, does not
require the seller’s intent or knowledge of the misinterpretation.31
The torts of fraud and negligent misrepresentation are not
mutually exclusive from breach of warranty claims, and buyers
asserting forgery claims against an art dealer may include one or
both of the tort claims as well as breach of warranty claims. A
recent forgery case in which the plaintiffs asserted a number of
claims, including fraud and breach of warranty, is one of several
actions filed against Knoedler Gallery and its principals.32 In
2011, the venerable Knoedler Gallery, New York’s then-oldest
commercial art gallery, shocked the art world by abruptly closing
its doors after 165 years, following allegations that it had sold
approximately $80 million worth of forged Abstract Expressionist
paintings over the course of a decade, including works attributed
to Rothko, de Kooning, Pollock, Motherwell, and other great
artists of the mid-twentieth century. Plaintiffs, in a spate of
lawsuits, alleged that Knoedler misrepresented material facts
in presenting the origin and provenance of the works, that

27 See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, Picture Imperfect: Attempted Regulation of the Art
Market, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 501, 525 (1988); Deborah A. DeMott, Artful Good Faith:
An Essay on Law, Custom, and Intermediaries in Art Markets, 62 DUKE L.J. 607, 624 (2012).
28 See Gerstenblith, supra note 27, at 525–26; DeMott, supra note 27, at 619.
29 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 137.
30 Id. The required elements for a claim for fraud consist of “(1) misrepresentation of
a material fact; (2) the falsity of that misrepresentation; (3) scienter, or intent to defraud;
(4) reasonable reliance on that representation; and (5) damage caused by such reliance.”
Kottler v. Deutsche Bank, 607 F. Supp. 2d 447, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
31 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 138.
32 De Sole v. Knoedler Gallery, 137 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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Knoedler’s statements regarding the origin and provenance of the
works were false, that Knoedler had an intent to defraud, that
plaintiffs reasonably relied on Knoedler’s misrepresentations,
and that plaintiffs incurred damage as a result of relying on
Knoedler’s misrepresentations. The cases against Knoedler
ultimately settled out of court without completing trial, resolved by
payment of refunds or settlements of enhanced monetary amounts.
The lessons from the Knoedler scandal should be apparent to
any reasonable art professional seeking to avoid an authenticity
dispute—in an unregulated industry with confidential
transactions on behalf of undisclosed principals, due diligence is
especially important. But how much diligence is due? At a
minimum, an individual seeking to purchase, or a dealer seeking
to sell, should obtain expert assurances as to authenticity and
explore all “red flags.” In the Knoedler cases, these “red flags”
included: a secret overseas collector with works that had never
been publicly exhibited and had no known provenance; and sales
transacted by intermediaries previously unknown in the art
world, at prices below-market, and at times with payments in
cash. Buyer beware.
C. Art-Specific Legislation
Until the 1960s, the art market remained largely
unregulated by any statutory scheme directed solely at the
buying and selling of fine art.33 Artwork was merely treated as
personal property, and the few issues dealing with artwork were
resolved through litigation in the courts under existing bodies of
law.34 At the state level, the status quo changed in New York in
1965 when a series of public hearings were held to discuss issues
unique to the art market, and as a result, several new laws were
added in 1966 to the New York General Business Law aimed to
address the rights of artists and consumers.35 Since then,
legislation specifically addressing art issues has experienced
rapid growth in several states, including New York, California,
Massachusetts, and others.36 At the federal level, there are laws
addressing the protection of art of specific classes (such as Native
Americans),37 of certain objects (such as those incorporating parts
33 See Leslie Kaufman Akst, Regulation of the New York Art Market: Has the
Legislature Painted Dealers into a Corner?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 939 (1978).
34 Id.
35 See id. 939 nn.3 & 5.
36 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 145; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1738,
1738.5–38.9 (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 715B.2–715B.4 (West 2016); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 104A, § 2 (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 442.321–42.325 (West
2016); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 1.01–61.13 (McKinney 2016).
37 See, e.g., Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”),
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derived from endangered species, e.g., ivory), 38 or of legal
systems (such as international treaties governing cultural
property).39 In totality, state and federal legislation relating to
the art market covers a broad spectrum of issues addressing
the protection of consumers, artists, the market place, and
cultural property in general.
1. Consumer and Artist Protection Laws
As the largest U.S. commercial center of art activity, New
York has developed the most significant regulatory body of law
governing art. In 1983, the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law
(“NYACAL”) was enacted, replacing most of the new articles that
were added to the New York General Business Law governing
the rights of artist and consumers.40
Notably, with respect to consumer protection, the NYACAL
provides a lay purchaser with stronger warranty protections than
those available under Article 2 of the UCC. Section 13.01 of the
NYACAL provides:
1. Whenever an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine
art, furnishes to a buyer of such work who is not an art merchant a
certificate of authenticity or any similar written instrument it:
(a) Shall be presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain; and
(b) Shall create an express warranty for the material facts stated as of
the date of such sale or exchange.41

Thus, if an art merchant provides a writing to a purchaser
with a description that the artwork was created by a specific
artist, such as an invoice, an express warranty is created.42
Effectively, the provision removes the distinction between
objective fact and the art merchant’s mere opinion with respect to
authenticity.43 The intention behind this fact/opinion provision
was to level the playing field for laypersons dealing with art
merchants, acknowledging that dealers may be incentivized to
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13 (2016); Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural
Sculpture or Murals, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091–95 (2016).
38 See Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2016).
39 See, e.g., UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954, May
14, 1954; UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970; UNESCO
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov.
16, 1972.
40 The Arts and Cultural Affairs Law was enacted as new Chapter 11-C of the
Consolidated Laws of New York by Arts & Cultural Affairs Law, ch. 876, 1983 II. N.Y.
Laws 2462, effective Dec. 31, 1983.
41 Id. at § 13.01.
42 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 90.
43 Id. at 146.
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affix a definite attribution to a work in order to inflate the price
and, in case of misattribution, to rely on the defense that the
attribution was a mere opinion.44
The NYACAL also provides strong protections for the artist
in artist-dealer relationships. Section 12.01(1)(a) of the NYACAL
provides that whenever an artist delivers an artwork to an art
merchant for the purpose of exhibition and/or a sale, the delivery
to and acceptance of such artwork creates a consignor/consignee
relationship.45 The art merchant will be deemed to be an agent of
the consignor-artist with respect to the artwork, the artwork is
considered trust property for the benefit of the consignor-artist,
and any proceeds from the sale of such artwork are trust funds
for the benefit of the consignor-artist. The trust property and
trust funds shall be considered property held in statutory trust,
and no such trust property or trust funds shall become the
property of the consignee or be subject or subordinate to any
claims, liens, or security interest of the consignee’s creditors.
This statute means, among other things, that the artist must be
paid first and that the artist’s consigned works cannot be
attached in a bankruptcy action. Section 12.01(3) provides a
strong enforcement mechanism by allowing attorney’s fees for
plaintiffs who successfully enforce their rights in court.
Moreover, any waivers must be clear, conspicuous, and in
writing. Notably, much of Section 12.01 was strengthened in
direct response to the scandalous collapse in 2007 of the Salander
O’Reilly Gallery, another seemingly reputable New York gallery
that was charged with fraud for selling works to multiple parties,
selling works without disclosing such sales to the consignors, and
converting such sales proceeds to pay off existing gallery debts.46
2. Object Protection Laws
Various laws protecting goods in commerce have been
enacted at the federal level to address the protection of art.
For instance, the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”) was passed in 1990 to restore
tribal ownership of Native American grave goods and human
remains.47 The statute requires federal agencies and museums
receiving federal funds and holding Native American remains or
objects to publish written summaries of the items and consult

See Levin v. Dalva Brothers, Inc., 459 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2006).
See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 21.
NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY THE ART LAW COMMITTEE
2–3 (2012), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072122-ReportonA7189S4988re
NewYorkArtsandCulturalAffairsLawNYACAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/322L-59CL].
47 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13 (2016).
44
45
46
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with the tribe affiliated with the remains or object to determine
and agree on the repatriation and disposition of the remains or
objects. The statute also protects Native American burial sites
and the removal of Native American human remains and
imposes criminal penalties for trafficking in Native American
human remains.
A federal law that has recently significantly impacted the art
and antiquities market is the Endangered Species Act of 1973
(“ESA”),48 and especially the regulations governing African
elephants under the ESA. First, a bit of background: in the
United States, the African elephant is primarily protected and
managed under the Convention on International Trade of
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”) and the
ESA.49 CITES, which took effect on July 1, 1975, is a multilateral
treaty signed by 182 parties, including the United States, for the
protection of certain listed animal and plant species.50 CITES
regulates commercial and noncommercial international trade in
listed species through a system of permits and certificates that
must be obtained for import and export.51 With the exception of
certain populations of African elephants that are deemed to be
recovering populations, all other African elephants are listed in
Appendix I, which lists species that are threatened with
extinction and are or may be affected by trade and therefore
subject to “particularly strict regulation.”52
The ESA, which implements CITES in the United States,
prohibits the taking, possessing, selling, offering for sale in
interstate or foreign commerce, importing, exporting, delivering,
carrying, transporting, or shipping in the course of a commercial
activity, any ESA species listed as “endangered” or any part
thereof.53 While the ESA does not specify particular prohibitions
16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2016).
See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2016); Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, July 1, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087; 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201–22
(2016) African elephants are also protected under the African Elephant Conservation Act,
which was passed in 1988 and imposes a moratorium on the import of African elephant
ivory since 1989. This moratorium, still in place, makes it illegal to import raw African
elephant ivory into the U.S. from any country unless certain conditions are met. Id.
50 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 81 Fed. Reg. 36,388 (June 6,
2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/06/06/
2016-13173/endangered-and-threatened-wildlife-and-plants-revision-of-the-section-4d-rule-forthe-african#h-11 [http://perma.cc/HZ4E-4FZU].
51 Id. at 36,389.
52 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora art. II, July 1, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087.
53 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 81 Fed. Reg. 36,388 (June 6,
2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/06/06/
2016-13173/endangered-and-threatened-wildlife-and-plants-revision-of-the-section-4drule-for-the-african#h-11 [http://perma.cc/HZ4E-4FZU].
48
49
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for ESA species listed as “threatened,” the Secretary of the
Interior (“Secretary”), acting through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, has the authority to issue protective regulations for
species under Section 4(d) of the ESA.54 The African elephant has
been listed as a “threatened” species under the ESA since June
11, 1978, and regulations were issued by the Secretary under
Section 4(d) to regulate the import and commerce of African
elephant ivory with certain exceptions.55 Notably, the ESA allows
an “antiques exception” for articles that: (a) are not less than 100
years of age; (b) are composed in whole or in part of any endangered
species or threatened species; (c) have not been repaired or modified
on or after December 28, 1973; and (d) entered at a port designated
for the import of ESA antiques.56
On July 6, 2016, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service issued
final regulations increasing protection for African elephants and
resulting in a near-total ban on the commercial trade in African
elephant ivory in the United States.57 For commercial purposes,
the import of African elephant ivory is prohibited.58 For
noncommercial purposes, the import of worked elephant ivory is
allowed if it was legally acquired, removed from the wild prior to
February 26, 1976, and is either part of a household move or
inheritance, part of a musical instrument, or part of a traveling
exhibition.59 For commercial purposes, only the export of items
meeting the ESA antiques exception is allowed. For noncommercial
purposes, only the following exports are allowed: (a) items meeting
the ESA antiques exception; (b) items legally acquired, removed
from the wild prior to February 26, 1976, and are either part of a
household move or inheritance, part of a musical instrument, or
part of a traveling exhibition; (c) certain worked ivory that
qualifies as pre-ESA; and (d) law enforcement and bona fide
scientific specimens.60 Interstate and foreign commerce in
African elephant ivory is prohibited except for items that qualify
as ESA antiques, and certain manufactured or handcrafted items
that contain a small (de minimis) amount of ivory and meet
certain criteria.61 Notably, “foreign commerce,” i.e. selling ivory
outside of the United States—as distinguished from import or
export—by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction is prohibited with
limited exceptions for ESA antiques and manufactured or
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id.
Id. at 36,390.
Id. at 36,388.
Id. at 36,418.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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handcrafted items that contain a de minimis amount of ivory.62
Interstate commerce, i.e. selling across state lines, is only
allowed for items meeting the antiques exemption and certain
manufactured or handcrafted items that contain a de minimis
amount of ivory.63 Intrastate commerce, i.e. selling within a
state, is allowed for: (a) ivory lawfully imported prior to January
18, 1990, the date the African elephant was listed in CITES
Appendix I, which the seller must demonstrate; or (b) ivory
imported under a CITES pre-convention certificate, which the
seller must demonstrate.64 Noncommercial movement within the
United States, within and across states, of legally acquired ivory
is allowed. The personal possession and noncommercial use of
legally acquired ivory is also allowed.
As demonstrated above, laws protecting art in commerce
present challenging and complex issues due to the difficulty of
balancing freedom of commerce against the need to protect
threatened or endangered species or classes of art objects.
Interestingly, the response by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
to comments received from the U.S. museum community during
the comment period for the final regulation on African elephants
suggests that there may be further consideration of how
museums are treated under the final regulation, and further
developments can be expected in this evolving area.65
3. Moral Rights Laws
Legislative initiatives to protect artists and their works also
took hold in the latter twentieth century. In 1990, Congress
passed the Visual Artists’ Rights Act (“VARA”),66 giving artists
new rights in their works, rights of attribution, and rights of
integrity, that are related to, but distinct from, copyright. VARA
protects artistic works from intentional destruction or mutilation
and requires that works be properly credited to the creator.
Significantly, VARA defines “a work of art” subject to protection
for the first time in the definitional section of the Act, which states:
A “work of visual art” is —
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy,
in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture,
in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that

62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 36,397.
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2016).
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are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or
other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author. 67

Some states had artists’ rights protections in place prior to the
passage of VARA—see, e.g., California (1979), New York (1983)—and
in some cases these state statutes provide broader rights.68
In addition, California recognizes a resale royalty right, and
is the only state in the nation to accord a royalty to the artist
when an artwork is resold.69 The royalty right, like the rights of
attribution and integrity, derive from the European model of
artists’ rights. The California Resale Royalty Act (“CRRA”),
provides, essentially, that where a sale of fine art for at least
$1000 takes place on the secondary market in California, the
artist is entitled to receive 5% of the resale price from the seller
within ninety days of the sale.70 The constitutionality of the
statute was challenged in a series of lawsuits in 2012 and 2015
and its status is uncertain.71 As this Article goes to press, the
Ninth Circuit is expected to rule shortly on the issue of
preemption, i.e. whether the Copyright Act of 1976 preempts the
state CRRA statute.
D. Intellectual Property
1. Overview
The field of copyright is an especially active one in the art
world because intellectual property rights—particularly
copyright and trademark—have a direct bearing on the creation
and marketing of fine art. Artists create original works and, at
the same time, they often use works created by others; museums
own collections, sell products, and license their names for
reproductions of objects and images. Those in the arts are
concerned about protecting ownership rights, while at the same

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).
See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-116s–116t (2016) (enacted in 1988); 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 320/1–8 (2016) (enacted in 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2154–5126 (West 2016)
(enacted in 1986); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 27 § 303 (2016) (enacted in 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 231, § 85S (2016) (enacted in 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-1–8 (West 2016)
(enacted in 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-1–3 (2016) (enacted in 1978); N.Y. ARTS &
CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.01–14.03 (McKinney 2016) (enacted in 1984); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
2101–10 (2016) (enacted in 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-75.2-1–10 (2016) (enacted in 1987).
69 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 2016).
70 Id.
71 See Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 2015).
67
68

Do Not Delete

134

3/31/2017 5:04 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 20:1

time concerned about protecting and preserving fair use and
access to works in the public domain because creativity thrives in
a vibrant and massive public domain. A working knowledge of
the basic principles of intellectual property is essential in the
field, and the rapid advance of communication technologies and
the resulting demand for content have focused even greater
attention on intellectual property issues.
Copyright and trademark are different concepts, protecting
different types of property through different enforcement
mechanisms. Copyright is described as a “bundle of property
rights.”72 The law states that copyright protection subsists “in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”73 It
grants exclusive rights to copyright owners and curbs those
exclusive rights with certain limitations (most importantly, fair
use) that further the public interest. A trademark is the exclusive
right to use the objective symbol signifying the goods and
services offered in commerce by the owner. Trademark principles
raise certain procedural issues—distinctiveness, relevant
market, likelihood of confusion, types of marks, prior use—that
are peculiar to the commercial arena. This overview will focus on
copyright, rather than trademark, because copyright is the more
common (and urgent) focus of creative communities.
For a work to be protected by copyright, it must be fixed in a
tangible medium of expression, so that the object can be
perceived, reproduced, or expressed for more than a brief
duration. It must be original and contain an expression of the
author’s creativity. The amount of originality or creativity needed
to pass the threshold is not high; so, for example, a change in
color or medium is not enough originality or creativity to pass the
threshold, but a change in angle or light might be. Copyright
protects expressions, but not ideas, procedures, processes, systems,
methods of operations, concepts, principles, or discoveries. Many
of the interesting copyright cases are art cases, whether they
involve a sculpture based on a photograph;74 a movie poster based
on a magazine cover;75 a new photograph appropriating the
underlying photograph;76 the ownership of the copyright in a
commissioned work;77 and a host of other art-related cases.

72
73
74
75
76
77

United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 283 (2002).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016).
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992).
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 708–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 2013).
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
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2. Fair Use
Fair use, which is an equitable doctrine that balances the
rights of a copyright owner with the rights of society, speaks to
specific uses of protected works that are considered “fair.” The
tension between an owner’s financial and security interests and
society’s legitimate access to intellectual property led Congress to
incorporate and codify a growing body of fair use case law when
it revised the Copyright Act in 1976.78 Fair use strives to ensure
that an author’s exclusive bundle of property rights will not
hinder the very creativity the law was designed to foster. The
doctrine recognizes that new works draw inspiration from older
works and that the productive use of older works promotes the
progress of science, art, and literature. Fair use permits certain
good-faith uses that, in other contexts, would be infringement.
These uses include criticism, comment, new reporting, teaching,
scholarship, and research.79
The fair use statute lays out the test to determine whether a
use is fair. The fair use test is a four-pronged, case-specific
analysis. It examines: (1) the purpose and character of the new
work’s use; (2) the nature of the original work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the original
work as a whole; and (4) the economic effect on the original
work’s actual and potential markets.80 These prongs cannot be
evaluated in isolation as a mathematical formulation, but rather
the test is a “totality of the circumstances” analysis. The
flexibility inherent in the test often leaves users unsure whether
the contemplated use is a fair use. The lawyer’s classic answer,
“it depends,” is particularly unhelpful to those seeking certainty
in assessing these fine-line distinctions.
Art-related decisions dominate the fair use case law, and
with good reason, because artists are entitled to fair use of the
copyrighted work of others, and equally entitled to vigorously
enforce their exclusive rights to exploit their properties by license
or other means. Fair use in the context of objects and images is
often in the eye of the beholder; one must determine and apply
the fair use test, with all its nuances and inconsistencies. The
one overriding question in the fair use assessment is whether a
use is transformative or productive; does the new work
encompass valuable creativity in and of itself? When a work has
been transformed, there is less likelihood of market substitution
and more likelihood of a fair use finding. This was illustrated in
78
79
80

See generally The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2016).
Id.
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the 1994 case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc.,81 where the
alteration of the lyrics from “Pretty Woman” was held to be
possible fair use because the new song, by 2 Live Crew, featured
lyrics that were substantially different from the original Roy
Orbison song, targeted a different audience, and posed little risk
of market substitution. Likening the song to a modern-day
parody that made commentary on the original, the Supreme
Court found that the use was productive and offered a separate
new value.
While a new work is more likely to pass the fair use test if
the new work’s composition, message, and use differ from those
of the copyrighted work, it can be difficult in the realm of images
to assess the degree of transformation or productivity needed to
satisfy the fair use test. In Rogers v. Koons, the court found that
a Jeff Koons sculpture, which reproduced in sculptural form a
copyrighted photograph by Ed Rogers, was not a fair or
transformative use because it added no separate creativity and
affected the market for the photograph.82 In Hart v. Sampley, the
sale of items containing the copyrighted image of the Three
Servicemen statue at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was found
not to be a fair use.83 However, in Wojnarowicz v. American
Family Association, the publication of fragments of a work in an
anti-National Endowment for the Arts pamphlet was found to be
a fair use because the portion used was insubstantial, and the
free speech implications were significant (note, though, that the
artist prevailed under an integrity clause of the New York moral
rights statute, the Artists’ Authorship Rights Act).84
Fair use has inherent drawbacks; it is expensive and time
consuming to make individualized decisions on a case-by-case
reading of the facts, and it is risky because the analysis might be
incorrect. Fortunately, fair use is not an either/or proposition;
rights management systems exist for situations where fair use is
inapplicable or impractical, for large-scale projects, and for peace
of mind.
3. Online Issues
The growth of the internet has been accompanied by a liberal
interpretation of both freedom of speech and of the fair use
81 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589–600 (1994). Though the
Court held that 2 Live Crew “departed markedly from the Orbison lyrics and produced
otherwise distinctive music,” the Court did not make a determination on the issue of
whether the use of the original song’s bass riff was “excessive copying”; instead, the case
was remanded “to permit evaluation of the amount taken.” Id. at 570.
82 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992).
83 Hart v. Sampley, No. 91-3068, 1992 WL 100135, at *2–3 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1992).
84 See Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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exception. The ease and speed of downloading and manipulating
images, and the mass of unrestricted images on the internet,
have lulled many users into assuming implied licenses to copy,
print, and distribute internet materials. Uploading an image
implicates the rights of reproduction and distribution;
downloading and printing an image represent two acts of
reproduction; and modifying an image implicates the rights of
reproduction, distribution, and adaptation. If the use is a fair
use, these activities will not infringe the copyright owner’s
exclusive rights. But if these uses are deemed not to be fair, then
each separate act is a separate (presumably compensable)
infringement.85 Interesting issues in the online environment
include whether a digital image differs enough from an original
image to garner its own copyright; whether a reproduction of a
work in the public domain is eligible for copyright when it is
digitized; how to deconstruct the separate copyright components
of a multimedia project; and who is liable for third-party
infringement. It can be expected that there will be many
developments in this area in the future.
E. Tax
As art escalates in value, collectors increasingly treat their
art collections as investments. The art collection as investment
property presents unique and challenging issues from various tax
perspectives, including income tax and gift and estate taxes.
1. Income Tax Treatment of Art
The rising value of art has led to the necessity of tax
planning from an income tax perspective. The income tax
treatment related to artwork will have different income tax
results depending on whether the owner of the artwork is treated
as a dealer, investor, or collector.86 A dealer is someone who is
engaged in the trade or business of selling art to customers.
Although the term “trade or business” is not defined in the
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”), case law has stated that the
taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and
regularity, and the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in
the activity must be for income or profit.87 A sporadic activity,
which the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) classifies as a hobby,

85 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (West 2016); see also FAQs: Copyright and Digital Files,
COPYRIGHT, https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-digital.html#backup [http://perma.cc/
D9G9-C5SG].
86 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 1169–71.
87 Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).
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amusement, or diversion, does not qualify.88 Dealers are taxed on
the gain from the sale of art held as inventory at ordinary income
tax rates and may take income tax deductions for ordinary and
necessary expenses incurred in the trade or business of being a
dealer.89 An investor is someone who buys and sells art primarily
for investment purposes, rather than for personal use and
enjoyment or as a trade or business. As distinguished from a
dealer who holds art as inventory in a business, an investor holds
art for the primary objective of making a profit from the
appreciation in value of the art over a period of time. 90
Investors are taxed on the gain from the sale of art held for
more than one year at the federal long-term capital gains rate
for collectibles, which is currently 28%. 91 Investors are much
more restricted than dealers in their ability to take deductions
for investment-related expenses, as they can only deduct
expenses incurred in connection with holding property for the
production of income.92 A collector is someone who buys and sells
art primarily for personal pleasure and is not a dealer or
investor. Collectors, like investors, are taxed on the gain from
the sale of art held for more than one year at the current
federal long-term capital gains rate for collectibles of 28%.93
Collectors have even more limitations on their ability to deduct
collection-related expenses than investors.94
Distinguishing between dealers, investors, and collectors is
often not an easy task because of the element of personal
enjoyment inherent in any artwork and the facts and
circumstances of the inquiry. Investors face a particularly difficult
task in proving that they are holding artwork primarily for
investment purposes and not for personal use and enjoyment.
While deriving pleasure may not in and of itself preclude finding
that a collection is investment property, the collector will find it a
challenge to convince the IRS of his or her investor status if the
activities and circumstances indicate that there is too much
enjoyment of the collection without the requisite demonstrated
intent to treat the collection as investment property.95
Id.
See I.R.C. §§ 1(a)(2), 64, 162 (2016). The top ordinary income tax rate is currently
39.6%. Id.
90 See Drummond v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1959, at *10–11 (1997).
91 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2016). Art held for one year or less is taxed at ordinary income
rates. Id.
92 Examples of investment-related expenses that an art investor may choose to
deduct include insurance premiums, storage fees, and subscriptions to trade publications.
See Wrightsman v. United States, 428 F.2d. 1316, 1319 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
93 I.R.C. § 1(h)(4) (2016).
94 See I.R.C. §§ 68(a) & 183(b) (2016).
95 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 1172–73; Wrightsman, 428 F.2d. at 1320.
88
89
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2. Section 1031 Like-Kind Exchanges
For art owners who do qualify as investors for income tax
purposes, like-kind exchanges under IRC Section 1031 may
provide a capital gains tax deferral opportunity (we refer to such
exchange as a “Section 1031 like-kind exchange”).96 IRC Section
1031 allows owners of investment properties to defer payment of
capital gains taxes by reinvesting proceeds from the sale of a
currently owned property into the purchase of a new like-kind
property.97 The property exchanged must be property held for
productive use in a trade or investment that is exchanged solely
for property of a “like kind” to be held for productive use in a
trade or business or for investment.98 The property exchanged
cannot be stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale
(i.e. inventory).99 Therefore, generally with regard to artwork,
taxpayers who are eligible to take advantage of Section 1031
like-kind exchanges will be investors who hold artwork primarily
for investment, as opposed to collectors who collect artwork for
personal enjoyment.
Section 1031 like-kind exchanges involving artwork present
an interesting mix of issues because there are gray areas
alongside clear-cut rules. On the one hand, the rules are highly
technical. For instance, the Treasury Regulations for IRC Section
1031 provide detailed rules for certain specific timing
requirements in so-called “deferred exchanges.”100 On the other
hand, much is unsettled, such as what constitutes like-kind
property in the context of art. The Treasury Regulations provide
the following interpretation of the term “like-kind”:
As used in section 1031(a), the words “like kind” have reference to the
nature or character of the property and not to its grade or quality. One
kind or class of property may not, under that section, be exchanged for
property of a different kind or class. The fact that any real estate
involved is improved or unimproved is not material, for that fact
relates only to the grade or quality of the property and not to its kind
or class.101

How to distinguish between the “nature or character” of one
kind of artwork for another is a question that remains a gray
area. On the one hand, the IRS rulings on coins held for
investment seem to focus on the function of the property held
rather than the makeup of the property, as discussed below:
96
97
98
99
100
101

See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 1187–90.
See I.R.C. § 1031 (2016).
Id.
Id.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1 (2008).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) (1991).
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In Revenue Ruling 76-214, the IRS ruled that the exchange
of Mexican 50-peso bullion-type gold coins for Austrian
100-corona bullion-type gold coins qualified for nonrecognition
of gain under IRC Section 1031.102 Since such coins were not
circulating mediums of exchange in their respective countries,
their nature or character were the same for purposes of IRC
Section 1031 as being gold coins.
 In Revenue Ruling 82-96, the IRS ruled that gold bullion was
like-kind to Canadian Maple Leaf gold coins for purposes of
IRC Section 1031.103 The Maple Leaf coins were traded for
their gold content. Therefore, they were bullion-type coins
whose nature and character were the same and thus of like
kind with the gold bullion.
 In Revenue Ruling 79-143, despite the coins appearing
similar because they both contain gold, the IRS held that
United States $20 gold coins for South African Krugerrand
gold coins were not like-kind to each other.104 The U.S. gold
coins were numismatic-type coins, the value of which is
determined by their age, number minted, history, art and
aesthetics, condition, and metal content, while the South
African Krugerrand gold coins were bullion-type coins, the value
of which is determined solely on the basis of metal content.
 In Revenue Ruling 82-166, the IRS held that gold bullion
coins and silver bullion coins were not like-kind to each other,
not because one was gold and the other silver but because
silver is essentially an industrial commodity and gold is
primarily utilized as an investment in itself.105
On the other hand, the IRS has ruled for purposes of IRC
Section 1033, which governs the treatment of involuntary
conversion of property, that lithographs are not “similar or
related in service or use” to artwork in other media such as oil
paintings, watercolors, sculptures, and other graphic forms of
art.106 Although we do not know whether the same rationale
would apply in the context of a Section 1031 like-kind exchange,
the conservative approach would be to select works of the same
media for a Section 1031 like-kind exchange.107
Rev. Rul. 76-214, 1976-1 C.B. 218.
Rev. Rul. 82-96, 1982-1 C.B. 113.
Rev. Rul. 79-143, 1979-1 C.B. 264.
Rev. Rul. 82-166, 1982-2 C.B. 190.
See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 1188; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-27-089
(Apr. 10, 1981).
107 In I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-27-089 (Apr. 10, 1981), a fire damaged an art collection
consisting of 3000 lithographs, some oil paintings, pencil drawings, sculptures, masks,
wood carvings and block prints. The taxpayers wanted to use the insurance proceeds to
102
103
104
105
106
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3. Valuation Issues in Tax and Estate Planning with Art
One of the key issues from a tax perspective is how to value
artwork in a collection. Art is inherently unique and therefore it
is difficult to find precise sale comparisons to determine value.
Moreover, there are large information gaps when it comes to
comparing the values of other similar artwork in the market.
Only 47% of art sales worldwide are conducted through public
auctions and the rest are private sales, the terms of which are
often confidential and sometimes known only to the
intermediaries transacting the sale.108 As such, the concept of
“fair market value,” defined in the estate tax regulations as “the
price which a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts,” is somewhat of a
challenge as applied to art in practice.109 Nevertheless, the fair
market valuation of art is necessary from all areas of tax,
including income tax, gift tax, and estate tax.
The IRS has developed comprehensive rules on the valuation
of art in the income and gift and estate tax regulations.110 As
contemplated by the IRS’ rules and procedures, the practice of
valuing art for tax purposes relies heavily on the opinions of
appraisers who are demonstrated to be experts in the property
being appraised. For instance, to claim an income tax deduction
for a charitable donation of artwork with a claimed value
exceeding $5000, the taxpayer must obtain a “qualified
appraisal” from a “qualified appraiser” for the property
contributed.111 To be a “qualified appraisal,” an appraisal must
be prepared by a qualified appraiser containing certain specific
information about the artwork being contributed, including a
detailed description of the property, a detailed description of the
qualified appraiser’s background and qualifications, the method
of valuation used to determine the fair market value, and the fee
arrangement between the donor and the appraiser.112 A “qualified
appraiser” is an individual who (i) has earned an appraisal
purchase replacement works consisting of 63% lithographs and 37% works in other media
such as oil paintings, watercolors, sculptures, or other graphic forms of art. The IRS ruled
that, for purposes of IRC Section 1033, lithographs may not be replaced with artworks in
non-lithograph artistic media and nonrecognition of gain was disallowed to the extent
that 36% of the insurance proceeds were reinvested in art works in other artistic media. Id.
108 See Eileen Kinsella, What Does TEFAF 2016 Art Market Report Tell Us About The
Global Art Trade?, ARTNET NEWS, (Mar. 9, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/market/tefaf2016-art-market-report-443615 [http://perma.cc/TZ78-6LWV].
109 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(a) (2011).
110 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6 (2011); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (1992); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A1(c)(2) (2008).
111 I.R.C. § 170(f)(11) (2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i)(A) (1996).
112 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c) (1996).
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designation from a recognized professional appraiser organization,
or has otherwise met minimum education and experience
requirements set forth in the regulations; (ii) regularly performs
appraisals for pay; and (iii) meets any other requirements
prescribed by the IRS.113 The individual will not be treated as a
qualified appraiser for a specific appraisal unless he or she
demonstrates verifiable education and experience in valuing the
property subject to the appraisal and the individual has not
been prohibited from practicing before the IRS at any time for a
three-year period ending on the appraisal date.114 Art valuations
submitted to the IRS may be reviewed by the Art Advisory Panel
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.115 Created in 1968, the
Art Advisory Panel is made up of art experts, including museum
curators, dealers and scholars, serving without compensation.116
As can be seen from recent annual reports, the Art Advisory Panel’s
valuations often differ from those submitted by taxpayers.117
Interesting valuation issues can arise when art is not owned
in its entirety but rather in undivided fractional interests,
particularly in the estate tax context. Although courts have upheld
valuation discounts for the transfer of less than a 100% interest in
artwork for estate tax purposes, this remains a developing area, as
seen most recently in Estate of Elkins v. Commissioner.118 In
Estate of Elkins, James Elkins and his children owned
percentage interests in sixty-four works of modern and
contemporary art as a result of lifetime gifts and transfers made
under Mr. Elkins’s wife’s will.119 Upon Mr. Elkins’s death, the
IRS denied the estate’s claim of a fractional ownership discount
of 44.75% to the artwork, and litigation ensued.120 Rejecting the
IRS’s argument that no discount should be allowed for fractional
interests in works of art, the Tax Court allowed a nominal 10%
fractional ownership discount to account for various
“uncertainties” a hypothetical buyer of Mr. Elkins’s fractional
113 I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(ii) (2016). See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(5) (1996) and I.R.S.
Notice 2006-96, 2006-46 I.R.B. 902 for further IRS requirements for qualified appraisers.
114 I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(iii) (2016).
115 ART ADVISORY PANEL OF THE COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ANNUAL SUMMARY
REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2015 2 (Sept. 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/art_adv_
panel_annual_summary_report_fy15.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4FX-CJPH].
116 Id.
117 For example, in 2015, the Art Advisory Panel recommended acceptance of 35%
and recommended adjustments of 65% of the appraisals reviewed. Id. at 4.
118 Estate of Elkins v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 86, 119 (2013), aff’d, 767 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.
2014); see also, Stone ex rel. Stone Trust Agreement v. United States, No. 07-17068, 2009
WL 766497, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2009) (denying fractional interest discount for estate's
interests in paintings, but allowing discount equal to estimated costs of partitioning
estate's interest).
119 Elkins, 140 T.C. at 87–89.
120 Id. at 91–93.
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interests in the art may face due to the children’s ownership of
their fractional interests in the art.121 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit went even further in ruling for the estate,
holding that because the IRS offered no evidence on the
discounted values and nothing in the record supported the
nominal 10% discount determined by the Tax Court, the estate’s
expert opinions on the valuation issue must stand (including
steep discounts of up to 80% on some individual pieces).122 Note
that the Fifth Circuit accepted the estate’s discounted values
based on the lack of evidence presented by the IRS, a mistake the
IRS is not likely to repeat.123 As a final cautionary note, family
entity planning with fractional interests in art may invite
scrutiny from the IRS not only from an estate tax perspective but
also from an income tax perspective, as seen in the recent case of
Allbritton v. Commissioner, where the IRS asserted a $40.7
million tax assessment on a family company that owned
fractional interests in art that was rented out to the family for
personal use.124 These cases illustrate the potential challenges
that taxpayers may face with the IRS in cases involving movable
and enjoyable assets such as art.125 It remains to be seen what
approach the IRS will take in future cases and whether any
methodologies will be proposed to provide guidance on the
valuation of fractional interests in art.126
III. CHANGING NORMS
As can be seen from the above, the attention from legislative
and regulatory bodies to the many aspects of the art world have
created a complex web of interrelated and unrelated laws. An art
law practitioner must know and employ a deep and wide
command of the law, whether representing artists, collectors,
galleries, museums, or others in the art market place.

Id. at 126, 135.
Elkins, 767 F.3d at 445.
See Diana Wierbicki, Elkins v. Commissioner, in LISI ESTATE PLANNING
NEWSLETTER #2085 (Leimberg Information Services, Inc.) Apr. 1, 2013, at 8.
124 Complaint, Allbritton v. United States, No. 4:15-v-00275 (S.D. Tex. 2015). As of
the date of this Article's publication, the case has been stayed pending settlement.
125 Diana Wierbicki & Bee-Seon Keum, Whose Art Is It Anyway?, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM
(Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/whose-art-it-anyway
[http://perma.cc/5CX4-AKAH].
126 Proposed Regulations under IRC Section 2704 were issued on August 4, 2016 to
limit valuation discounts for fractional interests in certain family-controlled entities for
estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. See Estate, Gift, and
Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes; Restrictions on Liquidation of an Interest, 81 Fed.
Reg. 51413–25 (proposed Aug. 4, 2016). Public hearings were held on the proposed
regulations on December 1, 2016.
121
122
123
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Not only are the laws evolving, but the art world itself is
evolving. The cozy circle of dealers and collectors, noted in the
Introduction, has grown into a mega-industry. Many galleries
have expanded globally, operating internationally as one gallery
or as separate related subsidiaries. Art fairs now fill the annual
calendar and galleries are expected to keep the business going at
home while simultaneously setting up shop for a week in other
cities, whether foreign or domestic. The time and expense,
coupled with the challenges of international transport, assure
that only the successful operators can participate. Moreover,
collectors who enjoy these social/commercial events and welcome
the opportunities to purchase at art fairs must confront a host of
legal issues inherent in international purchasing—what is the
situs of the sale?; what taxes are owed?; what are the remedies if
things go wrong?
Apart from international purchasing in the art fair context,
the global nature of the art marketplace assures that these
international transactions are becoming commonplace. For
example: a lawyer representing a client in one country sells to a
collector in another country; a collector/investor purchases a
work strictly for investment and stores it indefinitely in a
“freeport” such as the Geneva Freeport or Le Freeport in
Singapore. Freeports can be generally described as zones
allowing the suspension of taxes, customs, and other duties on
goods within such zones. Historically, freeports were used as
temporary storage facilities for goods on the move, and tax
suspensions in these zones were intended to promote trade and
commerce by lightening regulatory burdens that may slow down
transactions.127 Today, freeports house—on an indefinite basis, if
desired—some of the world’s most valuable art collections in
state-of-the-art security facilities that employ art professionals
and provide opportunities to transact business with the benefits
of privacy and limited regulatory oversight.128 It should be noted
that the tax suspension benefits of freeports are temporary, as
they only “suspend” the requirement to pay taxes until the goods
reach their final destinations, and once the goods leave the
freeport, transfer taxes and customs duties may apply depending
on the destination country’s tax and customs laws. Although
regulatory attention has focused on the wealth stored in

127 See Uber-Warehouses for the Ultra-Rich, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21590353-ever-more-wealth-being-parked-fancystorage-facilities-some-customers-they-are [http://perma.cc/Y4BK-C8R5].
128 Id.
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freeports, it remains to be seen whether these “safe havens” will
be substantially challenged.129
As transactions have become more complex (in value,
geography, or otherwise), written agreements have become more
standardized. Common terms include representations and
warranties, payment and delivery, responsibility for expenses
and taxes, insurance, consequences of default, termination, and a
host of other clauses, depending on the nature of the transaction.
And, as the Knoedler matter teaches us, dealers and collectors
will exercise more caution in commercial transactions, especially
those involving unknown or remote parties.130
Perhaps the most significant shift in market practices can be
seen in the areas of antiquities and objects of cultural patrimony.
The late twentieth century and early twenty-first century saw a
series of lawsuits demanding repatriation of cultural objects by
nations of origin. These claims asserted that the objects were
stolen property because they had been taken in violation of
nations’ theft laws, or were taken in violation of valid treaties.
Indeed, the illicit international trade in objects of cultural
property, including archeological and ethnographic objects, has
largely shifted as the ethics of collecting have been examined and
revised. Gone are the days of wholescale plunder of archeological
sites, causing destruction of the site as well as the context and,
often, the objects themselves. Galleries and collectors now largely
trade in properly documented, legitimately excavated, or acquired
objects. Similarly, museums have changed practices and now are
bound by ethics codes that prohibit acquisition of archeological
materials and ancient art without valid title, evidence of lawful
export, and a full history from discovery to the present.131 These
ethical codes govern not only the acquisition, but also the
borrowing, displaying, and disposing of such objects. It can be
expected that these claims will continue to be prosecuted, and
that newly-emerging nations will press repatriation claims for
indigenous cultural property or for artistic works taken
improperly in times of strife.
At the same time claims were asserted for repatriation of
cultural property, the latter twentieth century saw claims
asserted by survivors and families of victims of the wholescale
expropriation of art by the Nazis during the Holocaust-era. The

Id.
See generally De Sole v. Knoedler Gallery, 137 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Guidelines on the Acquisition of Archaeological Material and Ancient Art, ASS’N OF
ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS (Jan. 29, 2013), https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/
AAMD%20Guidelines%202013.pdf [http://perma.cc/AZP8-GE5E].
129
130
131
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Nazis plundered on a scale unique in modern history and the
consequences of art displacement continue to be felt today.
Numerous cases were decided against private collectors,132
museums,133 and nations.134 One matter, popularized in the 2015
movie Woman in Gold, follows the legal efforts of Maria Altmann
to gain ownership of a collection of Gustav Klimt paintings
owned by her family, looted by the Nazis in Austria during World
War II, and repatriated to an Austrian museum, where they
remained on display until Altmann’s successful recovery.135
Austria held the works under claim of right and Altmann
successfully brought an action in U.S. courts under the Federal
Sovereign Immunities Act. The parties eventually settled and the
works were turned over to Altmann.136
As Holocaust-era claims were filed against museums
asserting title to works in their collections (often acquired by gift
from collector donors), these museum defendants reacted swiftly
to address the crisis and to right the wrongs. Museums
acknowledged that holding and displaying stolen goods would be
antithetical to the public trust mission of the non-profit
institutions. Museums adopted guidelines for handling and
resolving claims, undertook research of their collections to
identify works with gaps in provenance during the “war years”
(generally acknowledged to be 1933–45), resolved these gaps if
possible, published such findings, and created easily-accessible
online search tools to assist those with repatriation claims.137
On the tax side, the value of art continues to climb, and it is
not surprising that taxing authorities are increasingly turning
their attention to art transactions. With mounting pressures
each year to bring in revenue, state revenue departments are
being particularly aggressive about enforcing state and local tax
laws, and art is not an exception, especially in New York State,
home to some of the world’s most powerful and prestigious
collectors and galleries. In 2016, headlines were made by New
York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman’s announcement
See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. 1969).
See, e.g., Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010); Cassirer
v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1064 (9th Cir. 2009).
134 See, e.g., Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 974 (9th Cir. 2002).
135 WOMAN IN GOLD (BBC Films, 2015).
136 See generally Arbitral Award, Altmann, et al. v. Republic of Austria (U.S. v. Austria)
(Jan. 15, 2006), https://plone.unige.ch/art-adr/cases-affaires/6-klimt-paintings-2013-mariaaltmann-and-austria/arbitral-award-5-klimt-paintings-maria-v-altmann-and-others-v-republicof-austria-15-january-2004/at_download/file [http://perma.cc/G6A2-5K2F].
137 Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Spoliation of Art during the Nazi/
World War II Era (1933–1945), ASS’ N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS (June 4, 1998),
https://aamd.org/document/report-of-the-aamd-task-force-on-the-spoliation-of-art-duringthe-nazi/world-war-ii-era.
132
133
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of three high-profile tax settlements with a leading gallery, a
prominent collector, and an art sales executive.138 The settlements
surprised many in the art world due to the high-profile nature of
the targets and the focus on common industry practices such as
the use of fine art shippers. All three settlements are significant
as a warning that New York State is watching art transactions
closely and is interpreting and enforcing its tax laws in an
aggressive manner.139
Another area to watch is Section 1031 like-kind exchanges
involving artwork, which has remained largely unregulated. In
2016, President Obama presented a budget proposal that would
exclude art and collectibles as assets eligible for Section 1031
like-kind exchanges.140 Although the proposed changes to Section
1031 did not take place, the budget proposal shows that the use
of tax deferral transactions involving artwork is on the
government’s radar. It remains to be seen what direction the
next administrations will take, if any, with respect to Section
1031 like-kind exchanges involving art.
IV. WHERE WE ARE GOING
Changing norms foreshadow many of the changes we can
expect to see in the future of art law. A dominant theme in this
138 See Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney Gen., N.Y. State Office of the
Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $4.28 Million Settlement With
International Art Dealer Gagosian Gallery for Failure to Collect and Remit New York
Sales Tax (July 19, 2016), http://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-428million-settlement-international-art-dealer-gagosian [http://perma.cc/V49Y-7HGU]; Press
Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney Gen., N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen.,
A.G. Schneiderman Announces Agreement with Art Sales Executive for Repayment of
Taxes on Artwork Acquisitions (May 3, 2016), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/agschneiderman-announces-agreement-art-sales-executive-re-payment-taxes-artwork
(referring in the press release which announces a $4.28 million settlement with Gagosian
Gallery) [http://perma.cc/PG48-ZZWM]; Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney
Gen., N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $7 Million
Settlement with Art Collector Aby J. Rosen for Failing to Pay Sales and Use Taxes on
Art Acquisitions (May 3, 2016), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneidermanannounces-7-million-settlement-art-collector-aby-j-rosen-failing-pay [hereinafter “Press
Release, $7 Million Settlement”] [http://perma.cc/VP8Y-WCRN]; Jennifer Smith, Aby
Rosen Settles Tax-Evasion Inquiry for $7 Million, W ALL ST. J. (May 3, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/aby-rosen-settles-tax-evasion-case-for-7-million-1462299474;
Kelly Crow, Art Dealer Larry Gagosian Settles Over Sales Taxes for $4.3 Million, WALL ST. J.
(July 19, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/art-dealer-larry-gagosian-settles-over-salestaxes-for-4-3-million-1468976952; see also GAGOSIAN, http://www.gagosian.com/contact
[http://perma.cc/BB3M-TCNF].
139 The tax investigations of the gallery and the collector were made under the New
York False Claims Act (“FCA”), a law that was amended in 2010 to specifically include tax
liability. It appears that the FCA, which has a ten-year statute of limitations, was used by
the Attorney General to impose liability on alleged instances of violation of the New York
tax laws on the basis of “knowingly” making a “false statement” or “knowingly” filing a
“false record” on tax returns. See Press Release, $7 Million Settlement, supra note 138.
140 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
129 (2015).
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narrative is that the art industry is increasingly becoming a
global industry. As of 2015, the art market was a $63.8 billion
global business.141 Sotheby’s and Christie’s, the world’s leading
fine art auction houses and long-time competitors, have grown into
multinational art businesses with salerooms in major art centers,
offices, employees, and representatives in six continents.142 The
presence and influence of China is increasingly felt in the art
market. As of 2015, it occupied a close third place, following the
United Kingdom in its share of the global art market by value,
and many of its collectors are setting record prices for
contemporary art at auctions and establishing themselves as
market players with connections to high-profile galleries,
museums, and foundations.143 For collectors, dealers, institutions,
and industry professionals, there are opportunities to transact
business worldwide and year-round at global art fairs such as
Art Basel in Switzerland, Miami Beach, and Hong Kong, the
Armory Show in New York, and the Foire Internationale d’Art
Contemporain in Paris.144 The top galleries have been aggressively
expanding their worldwide presence.145 Museums continue to join
forces with other international museums in traveling exhibitions,
and are expanding by establishing international locations, most
notably the Guggenheim, with museums in New York, Venice,
Bilbao, Abu Dhabi, and Berlin.
The increasing globalization of art mirrors the global
expansion of private wealth. Newly wealthy individuals from
Asia, Russia, Latin America, and the Middle East are interested
in collecting top contemporary art, living in multiple homes
around the globe, and exerting influence in the art world, as
demonstrated by the recent growth in private museums.
More globalization of private wealth means that planning
from a multi-jurisdictional perspective is essential for the
globally-inclined private collector, artist, art gallery, or museum.
The benefits of cross-border tax and wealth planning are clearly

See Kinsella, supra note 108.
See Locations, SOTHEBY’ S, http://www.sothebys.com/content/sothebys/en/inside/
locations-worldwide.html/ [http://perma.cc/GKR9-ALP4]; Salerooms & Offices, CHRISTIE’S,
http://www.christies.com/locations [http://perma.cc/VB4K-3F6P].
143 See Kinsella, supra note 108.
144 Which International Art Fairs Have the Highest Attendance?, ARTNEWS (Feb. 28,
2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.artnews.com/2015/02/28/which-international-art-fairs-havethe-largest-attendance/ [http://perma.cc/6H56-VBE6].
145 For example, at the time this Article was published, Gagosian Gallery had sixteen
locations, see GAGOSIAN, https://www.gagosian.com [http://perma.cc/DE2C-P3CU], Pace
Gallery had ten locations, see PACE, http://www.pacegallery.com [http://perma.cc/P7MD-49SH],
David Zwirner Gallery had three locations, see DAVID ZWIRNER, www.davidzwirner.com
[http://perma.cc/Z8LF-ED4E], and Hauser & Wirth had six locations worldwide, see
HAUSERWIRTH, http://www.hauserwirth.com/contact/ [http://perma.cc/8TU2-RUE7 ].
141
142

Do Not Delete

2017]

3/31/2017 5:04 PM

Art Law: Looking Back, Looking Forward

149

evident for high net-worth private collectors having potential
exposure to multiple taxing regimes and wishing to preserve
their wealth for future generations. These benefits also extend to
art galleries with international outposts that must contend with
tax issues that arise from doing business and deriving income
internationally, artists who create internationally and maintain
studios in multiple locations, as well as museums planning
survival and expansion by cultivating international donors. The
movement of players in global locations will also continue to
necessitate sophisticated legal advice in legal disciplines other
than tax, including immigration, cross-border commercial and
contract law, import-export law, employment law, and other
fields as well.
The art industry is also becoming more of an online industry.
Like internet start-ups in other industries, online art auction
businesses are fiercely competing for the attention of a younger
generation of potential collectors who are social media savvy,
appreciate efficient and convenient user-experiences, and may even
prefer the anonymity of an internet transaction in some cases.
As art continues to increase in value, art transactions will
increase in sophistication and complexity, with more
intermediaries in the chain and more art transported across
multiple jurisdictions. We may see an increase in transactions
among market players joining forces in transacting together and
co-investing in artwork. The increasing complexity and dollar
amounts of transactions will lead to further regulatory responses
and pave the way for additional developments in the law, whether
through administrative channels, legislative changes, or litigation.
A fascinating aspect of the growth of the art industry is how
the players’ behaviors are evolving in response to market and
regulatory forces. On one hand, the art industry has been
strongly self-regulated. Appraisal organizations such as The
Appraisal Foundation have established and are implementing
the standards of professional appraisal practice, such as the
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.146 Codes of
ethics have been established for the art trade, and are applicable
to members of the Association of Professional Art Advisors and
the Art Dealers Association of America.147 Museums are
regulated by codes of ethics of the International Council of
Museums (“ICOM”), the Association of Art Museum Directors

146 See THE APPRAISAL FOUND., 2016–2017 UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL
APPRAISAL PRACTICE 6, 8 (2016).
147 See THE ASS’N OF PROF. ART ADVISORS, http://www.artadvisors.org/ [http://perma.cc/
6VQB-E2NG].
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(“AAMD”), and the American Alliance of Museums (“AAM”).148
The Art Loss Register maintains the world’s largest database of
stolen art, allowing potential buyers to perform due diligence and
protect themselves against the risk of bad title.149 On the other
hand, industry players are increasingly wearing multiple hats
and these interrelated roles can raise questions. For example,
ventures such as art dealers putting on museum-quality
exhibitions, collectors and art dealers co-partnering on
investments, artists and auction platforms collaborating on sales,
and museums collaborating with commercial sponsors can
confuse the traditional roles of these discrete art fields.
Navigating legal and ethical waters in these various roles will
continue to present new and interesting challenges.
The field of art-specific education will continue to see growth.
There are now advanced university degrees and diplomas from
commercial arts institutes such as the Sotheby’s Institute of
Art being offered in art business management. 150 Coursework
includes art law, marketing and strategy, finance and accounting,
valuation, collection management, art criticism, and curating. It
can be expected that this professionalization of the field will yield
standards and best practices in the future.
Growth will continue. It is undisputed that the internet and
cheap transportation have aided the globalization of art
production and engagement with art. In addition, increased
political awareness could fuel numerous claims for repatriation of
cultural property against museums, collectors, and market nations.
This globalization of market players—creators, purchasers,
suppliers, and advisors—will grow in scale and complexity. In
addition to the international commercial law aspects of these
market transactions, these activities will touch on international
intellectual property, immigration, and other international areas
of practice.
It is fitting to end this Section with “the art” itself, and it is
fair to say that the nature of art is changing. Apart from the
market, i.e. the trade in art, the production of art presents new
dimensions and new challenges, especially with the growth of
technological innovation. The twentieth century blurred the
distinction between high art and popular culture, and it is likely
that the art of the twenty-first century will combine, recombine,
148 See Codes of Ethics, ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, https://www.aamd.org/about/
code-of-ethics [http://perma.cc/3A9S-CJA9]; AM. ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS, www.aam-us.org
[http://perma.cc/4GWD-WJ25].
149 See THE ART LOSS REG., http://www.artloss.com/en [http://perma.cc/JC8B-B6SN].
150 See Master’s Programs in London, New York, and Los Angeles, SOTHEBY’S INST. OF
ART, http://www.sothebysinstitute.com/masters-programs/ [http://perma.cc/U7LM-BEJL].
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and interconnect in new and unexpected ways. Driven by
social media, art is coming to be participative, interactive,
multi-disciplinary, and accretive. Engaging and entertaining
large scale (and often temporary) works such as 3D illusions and
light installations, or computer-generated works employing
virtual reality or artificial intelligence, raise a host of legal
questions—who is the author of these immersive multi-creator
works?; how are these works credited?; how are they registered
for copyright protection?; how are they recorded and archived?;
can these works be restored and recreated? In addition, the
marketplace will ask how this art can be owned, appraised,
and valued.
V. CONCLUSION
Looking back, art law has made remarkable strides in
providing a foundation and structure for the governing rules and
norms in this fast-paced industry, one which has evolved into a
multi-billion dollar global business. Still a young field, art law is
changing rapidly in response to the increased scope, depth, and
complexity of a global, interconnected art world. Such trends as
the astronomical rise in the value of artwork, mega-galleries,
increasing numbers of new entrants to the market, new
technologies, and new ways of interacting with art, all point to
the future of art law.
Looking forward, art law is certain to continue developing as
a dynamic and exciting field that demands deep and wide
expertise from its practitioners. With higher values comes more
risk to financial investments in valuable art. Risk is not limited
solely to financial aspects; collectors, dealers, advisors,
appraisers, artists, and museums all operate in an environment
which is ripe for increased regulation, new commercial disputes,
and changing ethical norms. The well-rounded art lawyer will
enjoy a role in the business of art and will be rewarded by
helping to shape and navigate the anticipated responses to
these changes.
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